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Abstract: According to current hierarchies of evidence for EBM, evidence of correlation (e.g., from RCTs) is 
always more important than evidence of mechanisms when evaluating and establishing causal claims. We 
argue that evidence of mechanisms needs to be treated alongside evidence of correlation. This is for three 
reasons. First, correlation is always a fallible indicator of causation, subject in particular to the problem of 
confounding; evidence of mechanisms can in some cases be more important than evidence of correlation 
when assessing a causal claim. Second, evidence of mechanisms is often required in order to obtain 
evidence of correlation (for example, in order to set up and evaluate RCTs). Third, evidence of mechanisms 
is often required in order to generalise and apply causal claims.  
 
While the EBM movement has been enormously successful in making explicit and critically examining one 
aspect of our evidential practice, i.e., evidence of correlation, we wish to extend this line of work to make 
explicit and critically examine a second aspect of our evidential practices: evidence of mechanisms. 
 
 
All studies are fallible 
The EBM movement views evidence of mechanisms as poor quality evidence. (Terminology: 
‘Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in 
making decisions about the care of individual patients’ (Sackett et al. 1996). ‘A mechanism for a 
phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for 
the phenomenon’ (Illari and Williamson 2012, p. 120). Here evidence of mechanisms may include 
evidence obtained by laboratory studies or previous statistical studies and tends to be relayed by 
expert testimony, e.g., via scientific publications.) This dim view of mechanistic evidence is most 
obvious when one refers to the 2011 Levels of Evidence table issued by the Oxford Centre for 
Evidence Based Medicine (OCEBM 2011), which places ‘mechanism-based reasoning’ at level 5 – the 
lowest level – of the hierarchy of evidence. (Here, ‘Mechanistic reasoning is an inferential chain (or 
web) linking the intervention (such as HRT) with a patient-relevant outcome, via relevant 
mechanisms’ (Howick 2011, p.929).)  Earlier evidence hierarchies, although often less explicit, also 
tend to leave only one possible place for prior evidence of mechanisms: the bottom level. For 
Canadian Task Force (1979, p.1195), for instance, levels I and II are occupied by statistical studies 
and everything else is relegated to the bottom level: ‘III: Opinions of respected authorities, based on 
clinical experience, descriptive studies or reports of expert committees’. 
 
Higher up these hierarchies of evidence come various kinds of statistical study, including controlled 
studies, randomised controlled studies and, at the apex, systematic reviews and meta-analyses. The 
thought is that for these statistical studies, the higher up the hierarchy the better the evidence 
copes with the problem of confounding. (This is the problem that an observed dependence between 
A and B may be attributable to variation in B’s other causes, rather than variation in A.) But it is 
important to note that no statistical study solves the problem of confounding. A randomised 
controlled experiment only yields treatment / non-treatment groups that are homogeneous with 
respect to the putative effect’s other causes in the asymptotic limit, as the number of individuals 
assigned to each of these two groups goes to infinity. So, while the evidence hierarchies may 
correctly identify the relative merits of various kinds of statistical study for dealing with the problem 
of confounding, in absolute terms these studies are all very fallible. There is room, therefore, for 
other kinds of evidence to influence decision making, even when high quality RCT evidence is 
available. 
 
In particular, since statistical studies are fallible, strong evidence of mechanisms can sometimes 
override evidence gleaned by a statistical study that is high up in the hierarchy. This is especially 
clear when there is strong prior evidence that there is no mechanism linking the putative cause with 
the putative effect. In this case, the best remaining explanation is that the increase in the effect 
variable is due to confounding. Thus it can be reasonable to dismiss the claim that remote, 
retroactive intercessory prayer shortens length of stay in hospital, despite evidence from an RCT that 
yields a significant correlation between the two variables (Leibovici 2001), on the grounds that 
current science holds no place for any mechanism that can explain the putative effect in terms of the 
putative cause. Similarly for claims made in favour of precognition on the basis of a report of 9 
experiments (Bem 2011) – positive results which eventually turned out not to be replicable (Richie et 
al 2012). Certain claims in favour of homeopathy – including positive results from systematic review 
and meta-analysis (Cucherat et al 2000) – can be treated analogously. While these examples are 
extreme, they clearly show that mechanistic evidence should not be confined to the bottom level of 
evidence hierarchies, but should, in certain cases, be considered alongside high-level statistical 
evidence. 
 
Assessing RCTs 
Let us now consider some simple historical reasons for our position, before returning to our 
philosophical argument in later sections. Historical examples suggest that the use of RCTs does not 
allow us to dispense with evidence of mechanisms, because evidence of mechanisms is needed to 
design and interpret RCTs.  This is well illustrated by one of the first and most famous RCTs.  This 
trial, carried out in the UK beginning in September 1947, was used to test whether streptomycin is 
an effective cure for pulmonary tuberculosis. The results of this RCT after 6 months were that, in the 
Streptomycin group of 55, 28 (51%) had shown considerable improvement and only 4 (7%) had died, 
whereas, in the control group of 52, only 4 (8%) had shown considerable improvement whereas 14 
(27%) had died (MRC, 1948, p. 771).  Seemingly the RCT was an overwhelming success, but there 
was also some evidence that the bacilli responsible for the disease were developing resistance to 
streptomycin.  This led the scientists conducting the trial to express caution, and to recommend that 
the observation of patients involved in the trial should be continued.  This caution, based on 
evidence relating to the mechanism of the disease, proved to be amply justified.  After 5 years, 32 of 
the 55 in the streptomycin group had died (58%), compared with 35 of the 52 in the control group 
(67%) (Florey, 1961, p. 133).  The difference here is not statistically significant, and this showed that, 
over a longer period, streptomycin, on its own, was no better than existing treatments. If evidence 
of mechanisms had not been taken into account, the misleading impression that streptomycin on its 
own was an effective therapy would have been given, and this would have delayed the development 
of the first genuinely effective treatment, which was a combination of streptomycin with para-
amino-salicylic acid (PAS).  
 
As the streptomycin case demonstrates, evidence of mechanisms informs the design and 
interpretation of RCTs. While it is theoretically possible to conduct an RCT in the absence of evidence 
of mechanisms – as in the case of Leibovici et al (2001) – most clinical trials do evaluate 
interventions that are somewhat mechanistically understood. Likewise, the manner in which this 
evaluation is performed – including the decision to clinically evaluate particular interventions; the 
way in which these interventions are carried out; and the measurement of the effects of these 
interventions. This makes evidence of mechanisms central to the business of conducting clinical 
trials. Note that this consideration of evidence of mechanisms does not mean that judgements of 
efficacy proceed on entirely mechanistic grounds (see e.g. Howick 2011: 128). 
 
Given that clinical trials typically seek to investigate novel interventions, the evidence of 
mechanisms upon which interventions and outcome measures rely is highly dynamic and rapidly 
changing. This can be demonstrated by estimating the age of such measures in contemporary clinical 
trials. Of the ten most-cited articles from the last five years of The Lancet (Scopus data April 21 
2012), the age at publication of both interventions and outcome measures used was estimated. Of 
these ten articles, collectively cited 6132 times, three (Black et al 2008; Daemen et al 2007; Goldberg 
et al 2008) were identified as non-RCT publications, and excluded. From the remaining seven, two 
each dealing with HIV-AIDS (Gray et al 2007; Bailey et al 2007) and renal cell carcinoma (Escudier et 
al 2007; Motzer et al 2008), and one each on HPV vaccination (Paavonen et al 2007), vascular 
outcomes in diabetes (Patel et al 2007), and breast cancer (Smith et al 2007), a total of 35 
intervention or outcome measures were identified (see table 1, supplementary material). The age 
was estimated as per the methods discussed in the supplementary material. Where there was doubt 
about the introduction of a particular measure, the oldest recorded instance was used. The average 
age at the time of publication is 15 years, excluding those interventions or outcome measures 
thought to be older than 100 years, with the youngest intervention ranging between 1 and 23 years 
(mean=10). 
 
The sheer novelty of these critical parts of trial construction indicate that, far from being background 
or common knowledge, the evidence used to build and interpret trials changes rapidly. Given that a 
central principle of EBM practice is the "...conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best 
evidence..." (Sackett et al 1996), we suggest that evidence of mechanisms should therefore be 
subject to the same process of systematic critical appraisal as evidence gleaned from trials 
themselves. 
 
External validity 
Even if we grant the soundness of an RCT, a question remains about its external validity. There is no 
a priori reason why the results of an RCT should be straightforwardly applicable to another 
population. This concerns medical treatments as well as policy actions. This problem is thoroughly 
discussed by Victora et al. (2004), where the authors point to several issues that hinder the external 
validity of RCTs. In particular, the authors dispute that the internal validity of an RCT also ensures its 
generalisability. The assumption that it does follows, Victora et al explain, from the assumption of 
‘universal biological response’. Victora et al. (2004) challenge this view and argue that although this 
assumption might well be hold for “interventions with short causal pathways”, it is certainly not the 
case for “interventions involving long, complex causal pathways, or in large-scale evaluations where 
these pathways can be affected by numerous characteristics of the population, health system, or 
environment”, such as policy interventions. In fact, there might be two threats to successful 
extrapolation in the case of policy: one is “behavioural effect modification” and the other is 
“biological effect modification” (i.e., respectively, “differences in the actual dose of the intervention 
delivered to the target population” and “differences in the dose-response relationship between the 
intervention and the impact indicator”).  
 
Cartwright (2011) makes a similar point and illustrates it with the example of the ‘Bangladesh 
Integrated Nutrition Policy (BINP), a programme that largely failed to have an impact on child 
nutrition, although a very similar programme proved highly successful in Tamil Nadu (TINP – the 
Indian Tamil Nadu Integration Project). Cartwright makes the point that policy makers neglected the 
different social structure of the populations to which they applied the programme, and this explains 
the success in one case and the failure in another case. Social structures can in fact be understood in 
mechanistic terms too (see e.g. Demeulenaere 2011). Evidence of mechanisms helps assess the 
external validity of an RCT (or indeed of any study) because it adds precious knowledge about the 
similarities between the test and target populations. This point has been forcefully argued for by 
Steel (2008). ‘Mechanism-based’ external validity inferences are a significant step forward with 
respect to the Cook & Campbell tradition (Cook and Campbell 1979) that connects validity merely to 
the representativeness of the sample and to the possibility of replicating the study. 
 
The problem of inferring from the population to the single case 
There is also another sense in which external validity poses a problem. Above, we discussed the 
inference from one population to another population. Here, the issue concerns the inference from 
the population (studied in the RCT) to a particular patient.  While it is a merit of the evidence-based 
movement to have fostered protocols for treatment in order to ensure standardisation and 
comparability, there is no a priori guarantee that an individual patient will be similar enough to the 
average individual of the RCT and that, consequently, s/he will respond to the treatment in the same 
way. In such cases, considerations to do with single-case individual responses will be vital to support 
a claim that the same treatment will work in the single case.  
 
This kind of consideration is particularly vital in treatments for diseases where a variety of distinct 
causal mechanisms produce clinically similar effects. In the case of breast cancer, tumours may be 
distinguished by the kinds of receptors they express, and this classification is predicated on the 
different mechanisms at work in these tumours. Similarly, melanoma classifications now often 
include consideration of particular genetic mutations (Clarke 2011). Both these cases are motivated 
by therapeutic considerations: statistical evidence suggests that differently constituted tumours 
respond very differently to particular treatments. Thus one needs to know which mechanisms, or 
features of mechanisms, are instantiated in the particular patient. Again, statistical evidence works 
better to “make decisions about the care of individual patients”(Sackett et al 1996) when integrated 
with evidence of mechanisms. 
 
Integration of evidence 
What we really need is to use the totality of evidence available to us.  When we must use fallible 
sources of evidence – and all sources of scientific evidence are fallible – it is better to look for 
independent converging sources of evidence, as a single good source of evidence will fail 
significantly often (Wimsatt, 2007).  Evidence of correlations obtained from RCTs or observational 
studies and evidence of mechanisms are independent sources of evidence that are usefully 
complementary.  We have shown that evidence of mechanisms supplements evidence of correlation 
in designing and assessing RCTs, and in inferring from population to population, and from a 
population to the single-case.  A serious problem with evidence of correlation is the problem of 
confounding: e.g., when a correlation between variables A and B may be the result of a common 
cause of A and B.  Tracing a mechanism from A to B helps alleviate that worry by offering a direct 
connection to account for the correlation. 
 
The parallel problem is that evidence of a mechanism does not on its own establish an average 
causal effect between A and B.  Evidence of one mechanism linking A and B cannot establish that 
there aren’t other mechanisms linking A and B, which may balance out, or mask, the effect of the 
known mechanism.  But evidence of correlation between A and B is exactly what is needed to 
address this masking problem. The best evidence that A causes B is evidence of a mechanism linking 
A and B, where the expected effect size between A and B is commensurate with the effect size 
observed in RCTs (if possible) or observational studies seeking a correlation between A and B.  
Evidence of mechanisms and evidence of correlation are complementary: each addresses the 
primary weakness of the other.  What we advocate is a pragmatic evidential pluralism, which uses 
the totality of available evidence. 
 
The problem that we have identified is not that mechanistic evidence is being ignored. Mechanistic 
evidence is being used to eliminate confounding, to set-up and interpret RCTs, and to extrapolate 
from one population to another. It is clear from informal discussions with researchers and those 
charged with approving drugs that mechanistic evidence is being used – often tacitly – alongside 
statistical evidence in order to establish causal claims. But all this happens despite the protocols 
offered by evidence hierarchies, which urge that, when good statistical evidence is available, it 
should be considered to the exclusion of other forms of evidence. Evidence hierarchies need revising 
to ensure that complementary forms of evidence are treated as complementary, and that evidence 
of mechanisms, currently treated implicitly, is examined explicitly. 
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Placebo Pre-1900 I >100 Escudier et al 2007 
Placebo Pre-1900 I >100 Patel et al 2007 
Placebo Pre-1900 I >100 Motzer et al 2008 
Indapamide 1975 I 32 Patel et al 2007 
Perindopril 1984 I 23 Patel et al 2007 
Interferon alfa-2a 1985 I 22 Escudier et al 2007 
Circumcision 1986 I 21 Gray et al 2007 
Delayed circumcision 1986 I 21 Gray et al 2007 
Trastuzumab 1989 I 18 Smith et al 2007 
Havrix 1992 I 15 Paavonen et al 2007 
Everolimus 1997 I 11 Motzer et al 2008 
Bevacizumab 2001 I 6s Escudier et al 2007 
HPV16/18 L1 vaccine 2004 I 3 Paavonen et al 2007 
Circumcision 2005 I 2 Bailey et al 2007 
Delayed circumcision 2005 I 2 Bailey et al 2007 
Progression-free survival Pre-1900 O >100 Escudier et al 2007 
New or worsening diabetic eye disease Pre-1900 O >100 Patel et al 2007 
Disease-free survival in HER2+ breast 
cancer 
Pre-1900 O >100 Smith et al 2007 
CVD death Pre-1900 O >100 Patel et al 2007 
Non-fatal stroke Pre-1900 O >100 Patel et al 2007 
Non-fatal MI Pre-1900 O >100 Patel et al 2007 
Progression-free survival Pre-1900 O >100 Motzer et al 2008 
New or worsening renal disease 1936 O 71 Patel et al 2007 
HIV immunoassay (Welcozyme) 1980 O 27 Gray et al 2007 
HIV immunoassay (Vironostika) 1987 O 20 Gray et al 2007 
HIV PCR 1988 O 19 Bailey et al 2007 
HIV LIA 1991 O 16 Bailey et al 2007 
HIV Western blot 1991 O 16 Gray et al 2007 
HIV synthetic peptide test Determine 
HIV 1/2 
1998 O 9 Bailey et al 2007 
HIV rtPCT 1999 O 8 Gray et al 2007 
HIV Unigold Recombigen HIV 2003 O 4 Bailey et al 2007 
Cervical cytology with testing for 14 
oncogenic HPV types by PCR Hybrid 
Capture 2 
2003 O 4 Paavonen et al 2007 
Colposcopic biopsy for 14 oncogenic 
HPV by PCR Hybrid Capture 2 
2003 O 4 Paavonen et al 2007 
HPV16 and 18 ELISA 2004 O 3 Paavonen et al 2007 
HIV ELISA Detect HIV 1/2, Adaltis Inc 2006 O 1 Bailey et al 2007 
 
Measures were dated using the following scheme. Procedures were dated in a contextual manner. 
Where a precise technique was specified in print, then the publication date of the resource referred 
to as descriptive of that procedure was used. For example, Bailey (et al 2007) specified the use of a 
circumcision technique dating from 2005 (Krieger et al 2005). Where no technique was specified, as 
in the case of Gray (et al 2007), the date at which that particular procedure might usefully be 
employed in the specified context was employed. In this case, the date was given as 1986, being the 
first suggestion that circumcision might be a means of preventing HIV transmission (Alcena 1986; 
Fink 1986). Diagnostic tests were dated by FDA approval date where available, otherwise by their 
earliest mention in PubMed. Drugs, likewise, were dated by first mention in PubMed for their name 
or synonyms in the general context of their use in the analysed trial. Note however that this did not 
take account of the context of that practice as either research or clinical. So bevacizumab is dated as 
2001 because of its first use in advanced solid tumours at that time (Gordon et al 2001). 
Combinations of agents in a trial were recorded once only in a publication. For instance, a trial 
comparing the efficacy of bevacizumab plus interferon alfa-2a against placebo plus interferon alfa-2a 
(Escudier et al 2007) led to the separate dating of bevacizumab, interferon alfa-2a and placebo. 
However, the use of placebo in multiple publications leads to multiple recordings in the final data. 
Measures without clear date of introduction were pessimistically coded into pre-history, even when 
they deal with relatively newly described diseases or when they presumably rely on new 
investigation techniques. For instance, breast cancer is ancient, but HER2 was identified during the 
1980s. Disease-free survival in HER2+ breast cancer is coded as >100 years. Where there was doubt 
about the introduction of a particular measure, the oldest recorded instance was used. 
 
 
 
